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University of California, Berkeley
The title question calls for some conceptual apparatus.  Only to
the extent that we can define community could we hope to show its
relation to our conference theme —the private and public practice
of the virtue of tolerance. Community is notoriously ambiguous,
and only a partial definition may be possible; by contrast tolerance
can be made clearer in concept, even if it remains very difficult in
application. Along the way we shall also need definitions for both
human dignity and human equality. Together these four concepts
—dignity, equality, tolerance and community—  may allow us to
speak coherently of education’s capacity to nourish community.
They give no comprehensive answer to our question but promise a
good start.
Tolerating Real Evil
Let us begin with tolerance, an idea that is given contradictory
meanings. Often in contemporary discourse it is said to consist in
an attitude of moral «neutrality» that  supposedly is required by
philosophical skepticism. Tolerance is thought to flow from the
Enlightenment premise that no authentic good exists apart from
the personal preferences of individuals; therefore, so they say, we
should never judge or interfere with personal or group behavior
that does not «harm» others in some material way.
Now, were the skeptical premise true, neutrality would not be
an inference but a contradiction; no duty to be neutral  —nor any
other duty— could flow from the proposition that good and evil are
arbitrary personal preferences. Neutrality would be simply one
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among an infinity of arbitrary preferences.  But, even were we to
accept neutrality as an authentic good, it could have little weight in
the practical order; humans are highly interdependent actors, and
neutrality among their conflicting preferences is seldom an option.
Whether we interfere in these conflicts or stand aside, necessarily
someone’s preference gets frustrated.
In reality we discover that not even the premise is taken serio-
usly by the champions of neutrality.  True philosophical skeptics
are rare and practicing neutralists even rarer. Those who like to
wear these labels are as quick to recognize and resent misbehavior
as are the rest of us.  Ironically it is this inconsistency that makes
the skeptic bearable; for tolerance does not consist in abstract
neutrality but in a well tempered resistance to real evil.  The only
conceivable ground of tolerance is the belief in a good that binds us
independently of our wills. I do not mean that the successful prac-
titioners of tolerance always grasp the terms of the real good in
particular cases; all of us make honest mistakes about its objective
content. All that the practice of tolerance requires is that correct
moral answers truly exist and that we are obliged to seek them.
Only because every rational human recognizes this obligation to
search for the content of the good can individuals and society ask
coherently: when two goods are in conflict which comes first and
which ought to be sacrificed.
Tolerance is the diligent inquiry whether it is best to interfere
with —or, instead, to allow— a particular evil (as one honestly
perceives it) for the sake of preserving some (perceived) higher good
that would be threatened by interference. When seriously engaged
in that inquiry, persons and societies are by definition being tole-
rant whatever we think of their answers. For our present purpose
perhaps the best example of tolerance in action is the careful appli-
cation by Western societies of the constitutional presumption against
official restraint upon written and oral expression. The state regu-
larly permits the communication of bad ideas in order to preserve
the fragile structure of open discourse. The responsible legislator,
judge (or citizen) understands that the moral vocation of the hu-
man person is best conducted within such a free system; and our
common experience tells us that everyone’s freedom is gravely im-
periled when the state chooses sides in the endless contest of
ideas. On occasion its intervention may be necessary, but this is
the rare exception. Our judiciaries establish elaborate rules to give
the process of decision the proper gravity and restraint, and cen-
sorship is imposed only in extremis.
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Note that the toleration of evil can be practiced in different
forms and degrees.  This is exemplified in the world of education.
The evil can be simply forbidden; no school shall teach racial ha-
tred or anarchy (zero toleration). It can be allowed; a private school
may be permitted to teach the pernicious idea of double predesti-
nation. It can even be encouraged; that same school can be subsi-
dized (perhaps because parental freedom is perceived to be a very
high order value). Finally, through honest political error, an evil
may actually be prescribed  —i.e. made compulsory; as we shall
see, this occurs in state education today in America (the higher
good that would justify this compulsion is undiscoverable, making
the result —but only objectively — an act of in-tolerance).
Tolerance, then, is the diligent effort to grasp and to realize
true moral priorities; it is one aspect of the ordinary process of
deciding moral issues in the objective order. This makes tolerance
close cousin to the virtue of prudence; we cannot make everything
exactly right, so we ask which goods come first. By definition tole-
rance entails the sufferance of evil; it is in this respect a negative
aspect of moral judgment.
Community, Dignity and Equality
If tolerance is negative, community is positive. It is good as
such. In the effort to define it one necessarily begins by asking
what sort of beings are capable of community. Apart from a few
hard core determinists, the self-proclaimed Communitarians agree
among themselves to this extent: To constitute a true community,
its members —with rare exception— must possess rationality and
free will. Clusters of non-rational or non-volitional beings (e.g. fish
or lemmings) could be communities only by the most remote analo-
gy. Communitarianism, after all, is a self-conscious ideal; it is a
movement.  Infused with deliberateness and purpose, it pursues a
certain state of affairs. It is only because community is a good
requiring rational choice that we could be obligated to pursue it.
Community is an imperative for free moral beings, hence strictly a
human enterprise.
This minimal criterion has been useful to the ongoing debate
about community; it has allowed would-be communitarians who
represent conflicting philosophies to criticize modern culture with
something of a common front. It cannot, however, ground the sort
of positive theory for which most of them ultimately hope. What
theory would suffice for that purpose, I cannot say; but one neces-
sary (if possibly insufficient) element is a descriptive human equali-
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ty. Community entails Jefferson’s factual claim of the fundamental
equality of persons (at least as a belief shared by and about mem-
bers within any particular community). Community will probably
require more, but equality will be one inevitable part.
Thus any definition will also include a descriptive conception of
equality; what I will now uncover is the only understanding of
descriptive equality in which I have confidence. It begins with the
assertion that human equality is both related to and importantly
distinct from still another concept -namely, dignity; equality and
dignity can be understood only together. Each is an identifying
property of free moral beings.  Dignity is familiar to us from Gene-
sis as the status bestowed upon the Imago Dei.  By their created
structure men and women share finitely in God’s infinite intellect
and freedom. Our dignity consists specifically in having reason and
will. And herein lies a problem.  The analogy to the divine nature is
naively intended to be ennobling but becomes problematic exactly
to the extent that humans vary in their intellectual power; dignity
is relativized.  I do not mean that Christians actually talk this way.
No hierarchy of dignity is suggested; the sensus fidelium would
forbid it. Nonetheless, many theologians have clearly believed that
the range of our individual intellect affects the quantum of our
individual capacity for the good, a conclusion which necessarily
implies relativity.
This moral gnosticism is an ancient misunderstanding. Aqui-
nas was following  Aristotle when he taught that self-perfection
turns upon finding the correct answers to moral questions; both
men supposed that our intelligence, education and sheer luck affect
our capacity for moral fulfillment. In this view dignity becomes a
nasty paradox; the very human faculties in which it consists gene-
rate a gnostic hierarchy based upon accidental traits.  Some of us
are more dignified than others.  Dignity begets indignity.
Happily the escape from this is plain and leads straight to
human equality.  Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Sua-
rez were simply wrong about who qualifies as a good person. They
were, of course, correct to conclude (as the present pope emphasi-
zes) that we are bound by natural and revealed orders of authentic
goods (or correct moral answers). However, it is not in the success-
ful discovery of these correct answers that a person is morally
perfected but, rather, in the act of seeking them. The honest and
diligent search that produces moral error may damage the social
order, but simultaneously it perfects the fallible seeker who has
tried as hard as he could to discover and serve that order. Persons
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become good and holy by doing the best they can.  A possible
example: In supporting the burning of heretics Aquinas did an
objectively bad thing; if he truly sought the correct answer he
advanced his own moral perfection.
This recognition that there can be disjunction between the mo-
ral good of the actor and the good of acts in the external order
saves dignity from becoming a gnostic hierarchy and simultaneously
provides the definition of human equality. Like every other instan-
ce of equality, it is a relation.  It is the unique relation that holds
among all rational persons in virtue of their uniform capacity to
achieve moral self-perfection by seeking the correct treatment of
one another in specific cases. This uniform potential for moral self-
fulfillment was given its implicit imprimatur in Vatican II which
repeatedly stressed the primacy of conscience as it seeks the au-
thentic good. The roots of this idea are at least as old as Origen
and —until Vatican II— were most evident in the work of St. Alfon-
sus Liguori. Unfortunately, it has yet to be taken seriously either
by modern philosophy or natural law. The former denies that good
could exist independently of human will; conversely, natural law
philosophers typically reject the proposition that a mistaken good
intention not only excuses but perfects. Obviously this concept will
also trouble those Christians who still hold for predestination and
against human freedom.  Nonetheless, it is not only orthodox but,
in my judgment, the sensus fidelium. Shortly I will show that it is
also a claim which has importance independent of religious belief.
Equality and Community
In rescuing dignity from the gnostics the doctrine of equality
satisfies the fundamental criterion of community noted earlier. So
far my grasp of this proposition is largely intuitive; I am confident
that it can be defended, but for the time being I will only assert it
as follows: If community is to hold, the most marginally rational
person —the most wretched and disadvantaged member— must be
perceived to have a capacity for moral and/or spiritual self-fulfill-
ment (and, conversely, degradation) that is as plenary as that of
the most gifted and fortunate.  In other words the belief in human
equality is definitional to community. Where, by contrast, humans
are perceived to stand in a hierarchial order of moral perfectibility,
the brahmin and the outcast may achieve co-existence or even
society; but community will elude them.
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I will not try to answer once for all the additional question
whether community, when properly defined, requires belief in the
equality of outsiders. The members of some human clusters do in
fact see non-members as deficient in moral potential. My present
disposition is to include such self-defining moral elites within the
definition but to demote them to a second class status in the
taxonomy of communities. It will be convenient simply to call them
«elites,» so long as that term is understood to be pejorative in our
present context. My impression is that the gnostic beliefs that
sustain elite groups have been on the decline in this century; few
Westerners, at least, suppose that those persons outside their own
family, church, race or other cluster are less capable of moral self-
fulfillment. Whether this observation is correct, however, it remains
true that members of self-perceiving elites are by definition incapa-
ble of belonging to any community in which perceived inferiors
would be included; in specific practical matters elites may, of cour-
se, either cooperate or conflict with communities that contain mo-
ral inferiors as members.
By contrast individuals who do accept the equality of all ratio-
nal humans are capable of membership in an indefinite number of
particular communities. And where this belief is shared by all
members,a community is entitled to the label «authentic». This
does not imply that all such communities share the same ultimate
purposes, life styles or rules of right behavior. Quite to the contra-
ry, believers in human equality can cluster on the basis of dispara-
te ideologies, religion, ethnicity, professions or the like —differences
that can set them in conflict with one another. Put another way,
although they are authentic, communities by definition can be
exclusive in important dimensions. The important point is that
inter-community conflict has a different meaning for those who do
and those who do not accept universal human equality as a fact.
The world of Roman Catholicism is a useful example of the
impact of this belief upon one’s attitude toward ideological ene-
mies. I will assume that the population of believing Catholics satis-
fies whatever other criteria might be thought necessary to constitute
an authentic community (the reader may specify them). In that
event, precisely as Catholics, their belief in human equality locates
these individuals in two communities —one exclusive, one univer-
sal. Catholics are, first of all, a community to and among themsel-
ves; their church claims authoritative access to correct moral
answers, and assent to that ecclesiastical authority is a criterion of
membership. Exclusivity is no trivial matter for them. Their ortho-
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doxy triggers meaningful obligation. In their own view they are
bound —and non-believers are not— to give the teaching authority
of their community a presumption of correctness. When engaged in
the quest for correct moral answers, observance of this presumption
operates as the practical threshold of the good intent that does the
work of personal, subjective moral self-perfection; the believer who
would meet his moral responsibility for honest inquiry cannot re-
ject an ordinance of the Church merely because he or she has
reservations.
By the same token, even honest apostasy on a serious moral
issue sets the individual outside this exclusive community. The
dissenter emigrates from the cluster that upholds the authority of
the Church. Because that authority is vaguely defined, there will
be practical disputes about who is in and who is out.  But the
principle is clear enough: The doctrinal emigre asserts that the
ecclesiastical authority can be wrong and —in this case— is wrong;
in his eyes the exclusive community that accepts that authority is
deluded about its reliability. The act of emigration is thus the
invitation to a new and more discerning community. It initiates a
plurality of exclusive communities (even though each may aspire to
the old name).
Finally, the exclusive community that consists of continuing
believers also asserts the commission and duty of their Church to
teach all mankind whatever can be known of moral truth.  But
does mankind, then, have a reciprocal duty to give priority to these
specific moral messages because of their source?  I take it that, in
the Catholic view, the answer is no. Every human is already obli-
ged to seek the objective moral good wherever he or she can find it.
The unbeliever or emigre thus has the duty —the natural duty— to
consider Catholicism’s moral answers along with the rest; but for
him they can carry no special presumption of truth. Rome is for
him but one of the world’s many representatives of the Tao. If there
is some added element of community in this neutral didactic rela-
tion between the outsider and the Catholic believer, at first it see-
ms very thin.
Nevertheless, note that in recognizing human equality, the Chur-
ch has embraced a principle of community which renders its own
particular moral answers irrelevant to the goodness of the person.
Its commitment to equality thus entails the richly communal decla-
ration to the outsider that, if he honestly concludes that the Chur-
ch is wrong (on whatever issue), he is not only bound in conscience
to reject her but, by doing so, he achieves the very end sought for
314
rev. esp. ped. LIII, 201, 1995
JOHN E. COONS
him by the Church itself. Even in the midst of the most intense
conflict, real human connection thereby remains possible. To the
insider the outsider becomes a full partner in the one essential
community that consists of all moral pilgrims. And this occurs
precisely when the outsider honestly refuses what purports to be
the authoritative message of the exclusive community.
Nothing in this turns upon my using Catholics as my example.
This relation between their exclusive community and its ideological
competitors is merely one very large and vivid instance of the sub-
surface harmony that is everywhere generated and sustained by
the assent to universal human equality. At least in the West, this
crucial belief is a cultural reality in most communities whether
they are families, nations, churches or neighborhoods. The inevita-
ble quarrels among such exclusive communities in their deepest
meaning thus reduce to disputes within the human family. These
convulsions, however destructive in the external order, never risk
either the moral integrity of the individual or the community that is
mankind.
Authentic community thus implies deep respect for the mem-
bers of groups whose beliefs conflict either with accepted public
values or with one’s own. This is specifically a respect for persons
and not for their ideas or practices when these are perceived as
false or evil. Nevertheless, this very respect for the person is the
primary guarantee that unpopular ideas will receive fair weight in
the constant calculus of higher good that we call toleration. The
common belief in universal human equality sets tolerance its speci-
fic mission. In the midst of their inevitable conflicts, exclusive but
authentic communities perceive the social order (domestic or inter-
national) as one in which persons —all linked in the relation of
equality— constantly interact through the political process to de-
termine exactly which concessions to evil will best sustain the
highest good. There will always be political losers; but in such a
moral culture the losers will be less often selected by raw majorita-
rian power; and they will themselves be the more willing to respect
and to sustain the painful and unending process of judgment that
is toleration.
To recapitulate: We now have comprehensive definitions for
tolerance, dignity and human equality. For community we have
only a split-level and partial definition; in order to restate it clearly
let us again assume that whatever group is to be tested satisfies
whatever else the reader thinks necessary to the status of commu-
nity. On that assumption elite communities are those that accept
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the equality only of their own members; authentic communities are
those that perceive all rational persons as equal in the sense that
all have the same capacity for moral self-perfection.  Conflict among
authentic communities thus always prescinds from personal moral
potential.
Community, Tolerance and State Schools
The public decision to allow particular evils is more often art
than science.  However, the focus of our present concern is formal
education, and here our conceptual framework actually yields some
answers. The first of these involves the specific function of toleran-
ce in regard to state schools.
When exercised in the public order tolerance produces judg-
ments that are embodied in a set of institutions, subsidies, duties,
prohibitions and freedoms. In the arena of education a huge varie-
ty of arrangements is possible. Those institutions that teach chil-
dren may or may not include schools that are owned and operated
by the state and tolerance plays a role in deciding that question.
Schools necessarily teach some set of values. State schools are no
exception; and, wherever consensus sustains a unitary culture, the
state school has the capacity to deliver its homogeneous message.
At the same time, out of respect for still higher values, even a
unitary moral culture (Japan is an example) may —up to some
point defined by law— tolerate contrary ideologies taught by private
schools.
Because of the pluralism of their cultures such toleration is not
an option for the Western nations today. In these societies a mini-
mal consensus may exist regarding honesty, observance of law,
«caring» and (possibly) human equality. But, in respect to ultimate
values, various important social practices, and the objective con-
tent of the good life there is simply no agreement. By definition,
above this minimum consensus, there is no social interpretation of
the good for the state to teach. State schools that promulgate any
set of ultimate values thus are affirming only some private good
held by those individuals who happen to operate the machinery of
government. This is just as true of those state schools purporting
to teach «neutrality». Even in this they do not succeed; but, if they
did, they would affirm a good for which there is no supporting
consensus.
In modern society the wise political decision to encourage pri-
vate schools often is paraded as an act of «tolerance», but we now
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see that this is an abuse of language. Such a policy could be called
tolerance only if there were a consensus identifying some evil being
taught by private schools that the state for some higher reason
could choose not to suppress. But the modern pluralist state knows
no such evil, at least so long as the private school satisfies the
narrow and undemanding minimum consensus.  Hence any public
critique of private teaching is impossible. To put it plainly in our
own terms: There is nothing that private schools are doing that
needs the state’s toleration; there is no evil to be suffered in pur-
suit of a higher good.
This presents a lovely paradox. The only evil that needs tolera-
tion is the compulsion practiced by the state school.  The very
parochial and insular message of these schools —one that is favo-
red by a monopoly of public resources and disseminated with the
prestige of public officers to a largely conscripted audience— is a
message that represents the values of almost no one at all. At its
best the public course of study tries to occupy the empty space
between the substantive ideas that thrive in the private sector;
vacuous and vanilla, its highest aim is to avoid offense to mutually
opposed ideological groups. At its worse it constitutes the political
triumph of one of these groups —the scientists, the Fundamenta-
lists, the whites, the homosexuals, the Catholics, the labor unions
or the educational  establishment itself. In either case —whether it
be pap or propaganda— what we are asked to tolerate is the ideolo-
gical preference of somebody (teacher, church, administrators, lo-
bbyists) who by art or luck find themselves wielding the power of
the state.
It is, then, the state school that must ask our toleration. Happi-
ly there is a justification for this institution; a higher good is at
stake —the authority and responsibility of individual families. So
long as substantial numbers of parents would freely choose state
schools for their children, tolerance would preserve that option.
But that toleration must be nuanced and qualified. At present
the most flagrant evil of the state school is its conscription of the
ordinary family which cannot afford to emigrate to the private sec-
tor. The existence of a state curriculum in a pluralist society is in
itself merely absurd and of little consequence. It could easily be
tolerated if every family —not merely the rich— could take it or
leave it. Under conditions of freedom, in deference to those parents
who want to use the state school, that institution could be endu-
red.  Unfortunately this criterion of family freedom is not satisfied
at present in many societies, most notably my own. The bureau-
cracies of the fifty states impose their own educational preferences
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upon all but the wealthy.
There is no technical reason that this narrow monopoly should
continue. Many systems have been designed that would provide
choice to the ordinary family.  Some are now in operation. I perso-
nally prefer a system of family subsidies (vouchers) that are large
enough to stimulate the formation of new providers for those fami-
lies who are unable to add much tuition. In such a system practi-
cal freedom would also require private schools to set aside some
portion of new admissions for children of low-income families.  And
any tuition that a private school would charge above the voucher
amount would have to be proportioned to the family’s ability to
pay.
Regarding curriculum, discipline and teacher qualifications, pri-
vate providers in such a system should remain as free as the
private and religious schools are today in America. Racial discrimi-
nation and promotion of criminality would be forbidden (i.e. not
tolerated); instruction in the national tongue on traditional acade-
mic subjects would be required (i.e. super-tolerated). The minimum
popular consensus that exists in the West demands both of these
policies, and no clear counsel of tolerance suggests otherwise. In
all other respects these private institutions should be allowed to be
themselves. So long as they propagate no evil that is perceptible to
the government of a pluralist democratic society, no issue of public
toleration is presented.
One possible exception that could raise the issue is the private
school that offends the consensus by rejecting the belief in human
equality. If Jefferson’s «self-evident» proposition is part of the con-
sensus, the state will have to decide whether to tolerate schools
that falsely propagate the moral superiority of some elite communi-
ty. In America the schools of certain Christian and Black Muslim
churches that teach doctrines of an «Elect» might be examples
(though our constitution would probably forbid a separate legal
rule for them).
Whether the state should tolerate such socially definable error
is best decided by trying to predict the practical effect that official
tolerance would have upon the reciprocal perceptions of all the
ideological communities —elite and authentic— that constitute the
larger society. If society publicly subsidizes the gnostic elitism of a
Mormon school, will this injure or advance the general spirit of
civic cooperation? To put the question this way emphasizes that
particular definitions of authentic community can demand a good
deal more than mere belief in human equality. Some, indeed, would
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require as a minimum that the particular cluster seeking commu-
nity status be one that shows respect for and participates in the
democratic process, including active and positive relations with
other groups that together constitute some larger order such as the
state. Because they identify a positive good or public value, defini-
tions of this sort locate community somewhere in the hierarchy of
goods which are to be considered in the decision of what (and how)
to tolerate. In the context of schools, the teaching of «bad ideas»
might, for example, come to be tolerated on the specifi-cally com-
munitarian ground that protection of free expression on the whole
enhances both the belief in human equality and the acceptance of
civic responsibility in all its familiar forms. These benign conse-
quences would, in effect, become part of the definition of «commu-
nity»;  and the sufferance of evil would be justified upon the positive
values of community now understood as an activity and not merely
as a shared belief about human nature and moral perfectibility
Community and Tolerance as the Private Harvest of Public Policy
Very probably most Westerners see community vaguely in this
more socially ambitious form. Indeed, they might have expected
this sense of community to be my primary focus; they would ask,
how might we through publicly regulated education, encourage
groups within a pluralist society to tolerate in private life most of
the errors we all think we see in the thoughts of others, so that
society together may better realize all its first-order goods under
the banner of community? What system of schools is most likely to
inspire an appropriate private tolerance of the perceived errors of
others who are making decisions about their own children? This
remains a burning question in my own country where the tide of
«melting-pot» philosophy has crested and seems about to recede.
Whatever the individual American states have been doing has ut-
terly failed to nourish community (in any sense); nevertheless, it
remains very hard for American public educators to face the obvio-
us alternative solution that I have already noted and will now
revisit as my conclusion.
A system of subsidized parental choice would enhance commu-
nity, first of all by taking human equality seriously. It is precisely
because it respects equality that the state would at last put ordina-
ry and disadvantaged families in a position effectively to decide
where their own child goes to school. Presumably there would be
schools teaching specific and diverse systems of ethnic and religio-
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us values; there would also be individual schools —private and
public— that succeeded as ideological «melting pots». There would
be «home schools» and schools for profit. The social arguments for
family choice do not stand or fall upon a prediction of the precise
educational preferences of social classes who have never before
had a choice. Remember that above the minimum requirements
and prohibitions society has no defensible alternative but to trust
the parent; this is not a counsel of toleration but of justice, for
there is no socially definable evil needing toleration. So far as the
state is concerned these forms of education all stand on an equal
footing.
Nevertheless, prediction of parental behavior may be thought
important in regard to the achievement of community in the broader
and positive sense that I just noted.  If that is the question, we
might start by remembering the actual historical impact of Ameri-
can schools upon intergroup perceptions. In my country the domi-
nation of state schools by 19th Century Protestantism and 20th
Century secularism has success-ively ensured that only the rich
have had choice; the rest have been regularly conscripted for the
«neutral» state schools, many of which until recently were legally
segregated by race. Just as forced segregation was socially demora-
lizing, the forced association of racial, relig-ious and ethnic groups
in government schools has proved to be nothing but sand in the
gears of community. The ordinary family sees clearly that its chil-
dren are social cannon fodder for those better off whose own chil-
dren study elsewhere. One could imagine no more effective stimulant
to inter-group hostility.
However community is to be defined, its first operating rule
must be this: Any society that would nourish trust in the common
enterprise must first show trust in ordinary persons.  Disadvanta-
ged parents may not always make the choices that are preferred for
them by skeptical educators, but —like the rich— they will at least
be acting responsibly in pursuit of a good that is real and not
merely a feigned neutrality.  What we know historically of those
American families who at great personal sacrifice have chosen pri-
vate schools is that they tend to be strong supporters of the larger
community. When children are sent by their families to schools
run by adults who share the parents’ world-view (whatever that
view may be) those children are more likely to read well, vote,
tolerate their neighbor’s errors and stay out of jail. This holds true
independently of social class.
The conclusion that freedom of choice would be an investment
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in community —in every sense— seems plain in America to everyo-
ne except the operators of the education cartel. If society wants
individuals, families and groups to participate in the political pro-
cess and to live in peace with their neighbors, forced assimilation
of the poor is not the best answer. Mutual respect among citizens
requires that the state itself show them respect, specifically in a
system of choice.  Of course, even then every individual would
remain free to foment discord or to build social bridges; far from
being a static and finished thing, community is an unending and
risky adventure shared by equals.
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SUMARIO: ¿PUEDE LA EDUCACIÓN CREAR COMUNIDAD?
Cualquier definición coherente de tolerancia asume la realidad de un bien y un
mal que son independientes de la voluntad humana. La tolerancia es el juicio honesto,
hecho por jueces falibles, de que la supresión de un mal particular dañaría algún bien
superior, como la dignidad humana, la libre expresión o la comunidad. Es una virtud
personal y pública muy cercana a la prudencia.
La comunidad se define en un sentido mínimo como la creencia compartida en
el hecho de la igualdad humana, entendida del siguiente modo: todos los seres
humanos, racionales, aunque falibles en diversos grados, son capaces del mismo
grado de autoperfección moral. Es decir, la plenitud  moral se logra por el compromiso
libre de buscar el bien real; quienes al buscarlo diligente y honestamente cometen
errores se perfeccionan tanto como cualquier sabio moral. No puede haber auténtica
comunidad con —ni tolerancia hacia— quien es considerado inferior en capacidad
moral.
En su realidad social (y generalmente en su constitución) el estado pluralista
moderno tiene sólo la limitada competencia de identificar las ideas «malas». El
consenso público acerca de valores específicos es muy reducido. Pero, por encima de
este consenso mínimo —por definición— no hay ideas que susciten la cuestión de la
tolerancia. De aquí que la noción de que la sociedad «tolera» las escuelas privadas no
tenga sentido. Es, más bien, la moderna escuela estatal la que suscita esta cuestión:
su reclutamiento ideológico del pobre y su monopolio sobre los recursos procedentes
de los impuestos son males que merecerían ser tolerados sólo si fuesen necesarios
para alcanzar algún bien superior.
Tal bien que lo justificara no existe. En consecuencia, mientras que puede ser
perfectamente correcto ofertar escuelas estatales para aquellos que libremente las
escojan, todas las familias deberían contar con las mismas oportunidades subven-
cionadas para poder elegir entre aquellas ofertas educativas que cumplan con unos
requisitos mínimos establecidos mediante consenso. Semejantes sistemas abiertos
se están desarrollando en Europa. Estados Unidos continúa, sin embargo, contradi-
ciendo las exigencias de la tolerancia al no tener en cuenta el hecho del pluralismo,
mientras que, por el contrario, se favorece un concreto conjunto de ideas que los
profesionales y grupos de presión hacen prevalecer ejerciendo influencia en los foros
de decisión. Aunque ninguna de las ideas que son excluidas puede caracterizarse
como un mal, quedan eficazmente prohibidas para los hijos de familias pobres y de
